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Abstract
This work presents Arcula, a new design for hierarchical deterministic wallets that signif-
icantly improves the state of the art. Arcula is built on top of provably secure cryptographic
primitives. It generates all its cryptographic secrets from a user-provided seed and enables
the derivation of new signing public keys without requiring any secret information. Unlike
other wallets, it achieves all these properties while being secure against privilege escalation.
We prove that an attacker compromising an arbitrary number of users within an Arcula wal-
let cannot escalate his privileges and compromise users higher in the access hierarchy. Our
design works out-of-the-box with any blockchain that enables the verification of signatures
on arbitrary messages. We evaluate its usage in a real-world scenario on the Bitcoin Cash
network.
Keywords. Hierarchical Deterministic Wallet; Hierarchical Key Assignment; Bitcoin;
Blockchain.
1 Introduction
In recent years, the adoption of blockchain-based crypto-systems grew at an exponential rate.
At their core, these systems create a free, decentralized, and democratic financial world where
users exchange their assets and keep track of their credits and debits with the others without
relying on any central authority. With the adoption of these systems, however, we also face a
new set of technological and financial challenges that we have never experienced before: How
to secure our digital assets, how to protect our financial privacy, and, when we are required to,
how to enable an auditor to evaluate our past transactions or to gather the blockchain assets of
a financial company.
In this work, we aim at solving these challenges. In particular, we focus on hierarchical
deterministic wallets. Similarly to how we keep our coins and our bills in a physical wallet,
a blockchain wallet holds all the crypto-currencies of an individual (e.g., her Bitcoins, Ethers,
and other coins). In particular, wallets usually hold the cryptographic keys that allow spending
these coins. Our goal is to design a wallet that is cryptographically secure, easy to use, and
that also guarantees some useful properties, e.g., safeguarding the privacy of users or allowing
∗The author is also a PhD Candidate at Sapienza University of Rome, Italy.
the auditing of the transactions of a public company. In addition, we aim at creating a wallet
that is hierarchical and deterministic. This means that: 1) The users can organize their keys
in a hierarchy that reflects, for example, the division in departments of a company. This
way, the financial manager of the company can spend funds on behalf of the departments,
but each department can only spend its own funds. 2) They deterministically generate every
cryptographic key of the wallet by starting from an initial seed (e.g., a pseudorandom sequence
derived from a mnemonic that is easy to remember or to store in a safe). As a result, the
users can reliably recover all their keys even in the case they lose the entire wallet (e.g., after a
hardware failure or a natural disaster).
To this end, we present Arcula, a hierarchical deterministic wallet named after the small
casket where ancient Romans used to store their jewels. We build Arcula on a deterministic
variation of hierarchical key assignment schemes, that generates all the cryptographic secrets
in a deterministic way, implements arbitrarily complex access hierarchies, and allows for their
dynamic modifications. Arcula ties the identities of users to their public signing keys with-
out requiring additional secret information — as identity-based hierarchical signatures but ex-
plicitly designed for the existing blockchains. Unlike other wallets, Arcula achieves all these
properties while being formally secure against privilege escalation. Besides, it relies on simple
cryptographic primitives and does not depend on any particular digital signature scheme. As a
consequence, Arcula is compatible with any blockchain that enables the signature verification of
arbitrary messages. We show its implementation in Bitcoin Cash, a fork of the original Bitcoin
crypto-system.
The rest of this work is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe in more details the
properties of hierarchical deterministic wallets and we discuss the state of the art, BIP32. Sec-
tion 3 introduces the notation that we use throughout this paper and the required cryptographic
primitives. In Section 4 we present a new deterministic key assignment scheme that we leverage
at the core of our wallet. Section 5 and Section 6 respectively describe our design of Arcula
and its usage in the real world. Sections 7 and 8 detail how we handle dynamic changes to
the hierarchy of the wallet and how we incorporate some temporal constraints into its design.
Section 9 discusses the related works and Section 10 concludes the paper.
2 Hierarchical Deterministic Wallets
In this section, we provide a more detailed definition of hierarchical deterministic wallets, and
we show their intended use cases. We formalize the properties that they require, we introduce
the state of the art implementation, and we point out some of its issues and vulnerabilities.
A hierarchical deterministic wallet enables a user to securely generate and store all the
cryptographic keys associated with her assets. In general, blockchain-based cryptosystems rely
on digital signatures and pairs of private and public signing keys: Users spend their assets by
signing the corresponding transaction with the private key; others verify the authenticity of the
signature through the public key. Public keys can be typically derived from the corresponding
private keys, but not vice-versa. As a result, on a high level, a hierarchical deterministic wallet
stores a collection of private signing keys.
The whole wallet should rely on a single seed provided by the user, and the generation of the
keys should be deterministic so that users can recover their keys in case of wallet loss. Besides,
the private keys of the wallet should be organized under an access hierarchy, e.g., a directed
acyclic graph or a tree. Each element of the hierarchy corresponds to a group of users and a
pair of signing keys associated with them. The privileges of a group of users depend on their
level in the hierarchy. Users with higher privileges (i.e., higher in the hierarchy) should be able
to derive the keys of users on lower levels and in turn to sign messages (i.e., transactions) on
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their behalf. Users on lower levels, however, should not be able to escalate their privileges to
the higher levels of the hierarchy, not even when colluding with others.
Formally, let ski be the private signing key of a node vi of a hierarchy and let pki be the
corresponding public key. Let skj and pkj be, respectively, the private and public keys associated
with a j-th child vj of vi. A hierarchical deterministic wallet shall have the following properties:
Property 2.1 (Security to Key Recovery). It is computationally infeasible to recover the private
key ski by starting from any children private key skj .
Property 2.2 (Deterministic Generation). All the skj private keys of a subtree are determin-
istically generated from the private key ski of vi.
Property 2.3 (Public Key Derivation). All the pkj public keys of a subtree are deterministically
generated from the public key pki of vi, without requiring the knowledge of its private key ski.
Property 2.1 guarantees the security of the wallet so that any arbitrary number of colluding
users lower in the hierarchy cannot escalate their privileges and recover the key of a user higher
in the hierarchy. Property 2.2 guarantees that the entire wallet is generated deterministically
from an initial seed and, in turn, that users will not lose their assets as long as they remember
the seed. Property 2.3 requires every public key to be derivable without relying on any secret in-
formation. Such property trades the privacy of the users for some additional capabilities within
the blockchain, e.g. to allow the auditing of the funds in the wallet or the generation of new
public keys in an insecure environment. As an example, an online marketplace could leverage
this property to generate a fresh public address for each of its customers in an untrusted web
server, while keeping its secret keys in cold storage. An attacker compromising the web server
would not compromise the secret keys and would not be able to spend its funds. Similarly,
an auditor could leverage the same generation process to inspect all the holdings of the online
marketplace. As we will see, BIP32, the state of the art implementation of hierarchical deter-
ministic wallets, fails to satisfy all these properties at the same time. Arcula instead, our design
of HDW, achieves them all and also allows its users to dismiss the public derivation property
to safeguard their privacy.
In particular, we evaluate a hierarchical deterministic wallet within the following three-levels
security model, sorted according to increasing requirements of trust:
Untrusted Environment: The superficial level of the model is entirely untrusted. The web
server of an online-based merchant fits into this level. As an example, the merchant aims
at associating a different public key to each object in its catalog. When adding a new
object to the store, he leverages the public key derivation (Property 2.3) to derive a new
public key for the object without storing any sensitive information on the untrusted web-
server. Similarly, the merchant could use the public key derivation to generate a fresh
address for every incoming payment without storing the corresponding secret keys on the
web-server. An auditor that aims at inspecting the transactions and the holdings of the
wallet also fits in this environment. By providing her with the public key at the root of
the hierarchy, the users enable the auditor to inspect the wallet without revealing any
secret information.
Warm Environment: The middle level of the security model is semi-trusted. The different
departments of a large company fit into this level. The headquarters of the company might
structure the hierarchy of the wallet to reflect the different departments, with the root
corresponding to the main office and the children to the departments. Each department
autonomously manages its own subtree and its assets. Nonetheless, no department can
spend on behalf of the main office or of the other departments. Compromising any node
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of the warm environment corresponds to compromising its subtree of the hierarchy and
nothing more.
Cold Storage: The cold storage is the deepest level of the security model. It is entirely
trusted and, usually, it is disconnected from the network, and it also is physically secured.
An example of cold storage is a hardware token storing the deterministic seed that gener-
ates the entire wallet. As a result, compromising the cold storage implies compromising
the entire wallet and any asset associated with its accounts.
2.1 BIP32: Bitcoin hierarchical deterministic wallets
The state of the art implementation of hierarchical deterministic wallets has been defined in
Bitcoin Improvement Proposal 32 (BIP-0032) in 2012 [18]. It builds on the same public key
cryptography used in Bitcoin, Elliptic Curve Cryptography using the field and curve parameters
defined by the standard secp256k1. Let g be the generator point of an Elliptic Curve defined
over a group a cyclic group G of order q. A private key sk (of 256 bits in Bitcoin) is associated
with its public key pk = gsk. Let H be a hash function, then the children private keys ski are
derived as follows:
ski = H(pk‖i) + sk mod q (1)
Children public keys pki, instead, are derived as follows (we omit the mod q operators for
shortness):
pki = g
ski
pki = g
H(pk‖i)+sk
pki = g
H(pk‖i) · gsk
pki = g
H(pk‖i) · pk (2)
Equations (1) and (2) respectively satisfy the properties of deterministic generation and public
derivation (Properties 2.2 and 2.3). However, BIP32 is not secure against key recovery (Prop-
erty 2.1), because Equation (1) creates a key recovery vulnerability, where the knowledge of a
children private key ski and the root public key pk allows recovering the root private key sk.
From Equation (1):
ski = H(pk‖i) + sk mod q
sk = ski − H(ski‖i) mod q
This privilege escalation vulnerability has been discussed in the BIP32 specification and also
by several security researchers [6, 7, 14]. Essentially, the derivation defined in Equation (1)
leverages an invertible operation. For this reason, all the secret keys of a BIP32 wallet rely on
a single secret value, sk, shared between all nodes. As a result, when we discuss the security
of BIP32 in our model the cold storage and warm environment collapse into a single level:
Compromising any individual node immediately leads to compromising the entire wallet.
The BIP32 proposal addresses this issue by designing an additional key derivation method,
that generates a so-called hardened private key skhi , as follows:
skhi = H(sk‖i) + sk mod q
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The hardened key generation process trades the property of public key derivation for security
to key recovery (i.e., Property 2.3 for Property 2.1), since generating a new hardened public
key pkhi now requires knowledge of the root secret key sk:
pkhi = g
skhi = gH(sk‖i)+sk = gH(sk‖i) · pk
As a result, BIP32 fails to satisfy the three required properties all at the same time.
BIP32 also adds 256 bits of additional entropy to the generation process. This entropy aims
at improving the privacy of the wallet so that there is no straightforward connection between
the children and parent public keys. More in details, BIP32 defines an extended private key
as the pair (sk, c), where c is called the chain code and is an integer of 256 bits (the entropy).
The generation process takes as input the parent’s extended private key (sk, c) and generates
the extended private key (ski, ci) of the i-th children. It replaces the hash function H of the
previous equations with a pseudorandom function Fc implemented with HMAC-SHA512. The
resulting output is 512 bits long and its most and least 256 bits respectively encode the integers
ski and ci. More in details, given the pair (sk, c) the BIP32 generation function outputs a child
key (ski, ci) as follows:
H =
{
Fc(g
sk‖i) if i is not a hardened child
Fc(sk‖i) if i is a hardened child
(3)
HL, ci = H[: 256],H[256 :]
ski = HL + sk mod q
The generation of the extended key (sk, c) of the root of the hierarchy starts from a seed provided
by the user, S−1, and proceeds to derive the secret key and the chain code by replacing Equa-
tion (3) with H = Fc(S−1) where c is the hardcoded string Bitcoin Seed.
In short, we formalize the three following scenarios related to the security and privacy of
BIP32, differing in whether the chain code c of the wallet is a public parameter and on whether
hardened key derivation is enabled. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first formal
definition of the security and privacy scenarios of BIP32 and any hierarchical deterministic
wallet supporting public-key derivation.
Public Chain Code: We begin by studying the scenario where the chain code c is a public
parameter of the wallet, and the hardened key derivation is disabled. In this setting, the
public key generation happens in an entirely untrusted environment and, as a result, can
be run by any individual of the system (including those outside the wallet). For this
reason, there is no pseudo-anonymity associated with the public keys of the wallets. An
external, passive observer can correlate together with the public keys of the wallet by
repeating the public-key derivation.
Private Chain Code: In this scenario, the hardened key derivation is still disabled, but the
chain code c is a private parameter of the wallet and has to be explicitly provided to
any party that aims at running the key derivation (e.g., an auditor or a web-server that
generates a fresh address for each payment). As long as c is private any pair of public
keys of the wallet looks uncorrelated; as such, there is a weak pseudo-anonymity. In
particular, the public keys look uncorrelated to any passive observer. Nonetheless, an
active adversary can compromise the web-server (that we assume to be insecure), uncover
the chain code c, and in turn reveal the correlation between the public keys.
Hardened Derivation: The last scenario considers hardened key derivation. In this case,
deriving the public key of any children requires the knowledge of both the chain code
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(that we assume public) and the private key of its father. For this reason, uncovering a
correlation between any pair of public keys is as hard as compromising their corresponding
private keys. However, this scenario does not allow public key derivation in an untrusted
or semi-trusted environment.
Finally, we point out the following issues of BIP32. First, it constrains the access hierarchy to
a tree structure. Equations (1) and (2) do not handle the key derivation of any node with more
than one predecessors in the hierarchy. Many use cases, however, require a more complex access
hierarchy (i.e., any directed acyclic graph). For example, consider two or more departments of a
company that collaborate on a project. They have a shared budget and need to spend from the
shared budget without revealing their own secret key. An access hierarchy encoding this context
would derive a single node, the budget, as a successor of multiple others (the departments).
Besides, we also note that in the Public Chain Code model, where we derive the public keys
in an untrusted environment, the entropy added by BIP32 serves no purpose. The key derivation
of Equation (3) requires indeed the chain code c for the public key generation. The attacker has
unrestricted access to the public derivation and, as such, in an untrusted environment, the chain
code is equivalent to a public parameter of the wallet. In the real world, we assume the Private
Chain Code model, where the chain code protects the privacy of the users of the wallet only
against a passive attacker. An active attacker, instead, could obtain it in several ways: E.g.,
by compromising the web-server of an online marketplace, by impersonating an auditor, or by
corrupting any user of the wallet. The chain code, in turn, would allow him to uncover the
public keys associated with all the nodes of the wallet and to jeopardize the anonymity of its
users.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Notation
We use the notation [n] = {1, . . . , n}. Uppercase boldface letters (such as X) are used to denote
random variables, lowercase letters (such as x) to denote concrete values, calligraphic letters
(such as X ) to denote sets, and sans serif letters (such as A) to denote algorithms. All of our
algorithms are modeled as (possibly interactive) Turing machines; if algorithm A has access to
some oracle O, we often write QO for the set of queries asked by A to O.
For a string x ∈ {0, 1}∗, we let |x| be its length; |X | represents the cardinality of the set X .
When x is chosen randomly in X , we write x←$X . We write y = A(x) to denote a run of the
algorithm A on input x and output y; if A is randomized, y is a random variable and A(x; r)
denotes a run of A on input x and (uniform) randomness r. We sometimes write y←$A(x)
to denote a run of the randomized algorithm A over the input x and uniform randomness.
An algorithm A is probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) if A is randomized and for any input
x, r ∈ {0, 1}∗ the computation of A(x; r) terminates in a polynomial number of steps (in the
input size).
Throughout the paper, we denote by λ ∈ N the security parameter and we implicitly assume
that every algorithm takes as input the security parameter. A function ν : N → [0, 1] is called
negligible in the security parameter λ if it vanishes faster than the inverse of any polynomial in
λ, i.e., ν(λ) ∈ O(1/p(λ)) for all positive polynomials p(λ). We sometimes write negl(λ) (resp.,
poly(λ)) to denote an unspecified negligible function (resp., polynomial function) in the security
parameter.
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3.2 Pseudorandom Function (PRF) Family
Let {Kλ,Xλ,Yλ}λ∈N be a sequence of sets. For λ ∈ N, a PRF family {Fk}k∈Kλ is a set of
functions such that Fk : Xλ → Yλ and each function is evaluable by a deterministic polynomial
time algorithm F, i.e., F(k, ·) = Fk(·).
Let Fλ be the set of all functions from Xλ to Yλ. For security, we require that a function
randomly sampled from {Fk}k∈Kλis indistinguishable by a function randomly sampled from Fλ.
Definition 3.1 (Pseudorandomness). A PRF family {Fk}k∈Kλ is pseudorandom if for every
PPT adversary A we have:∣∣∣∣∣Pr
[
G
prf−0
F,A (λ) = 0
]
− Pr
[
G
prf−1
F,A (λ) = 1
]∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ) ,
where the two experiments Gprf−0F,A (λ) and G
prf−1
F,A (λ) are defined in the following way:
G
prf−0
F,A (λ)
k←$Kλ
d←$AFk(·)(1λ)
return d
G
prf−1
F,A (λ)
f ←$Fλ
d←$Af(·)(1λ)
return d
In this paper, we are interested in PRF families such that Kλ = Yλ = {0, 1}
λ.
3.3 Symmetric Encryption Scheme
We follow the definition of symmetric encryption scheme provided by Atallah et al. [3]. A
symmetric-key encryption scheme Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) with message space M is a triple of
polynomial-time algorithm defined in the following way:
Gen(1λ): The randomized key generation algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1λ and
outputs a secret key sk.
Enc(sk,m): The deterministic (possibly randomized) encryption algorithm takes as input a
secret key sk, a message m ∈ M, and outputs a ciphertext c.
Dec(sk, c): The deterministic decryption algorithm takes as input a secret key sk, a ciphertext
c, and outputs a message m.
For correctness, we require that honestly generated ciphertexts must decrypt correctly.
Definition 3.2 (Correctness of symmetric encryption). A symmetric encryption scheme Π =
(Gen,Enc,Dec) with message space M is correct if ∀λ ∈ N,∀m ∈ M:
Pr
[
Dec(sk,Enc(sk,m)) = m
∣∣∣ sk←$Gen(1λ) ] = 1
For security, we are interested in semantic security: It must be infeasible to distinguish
between an encryption of a message m from one of a random message.
Definition 3.3 (Semantic Security). A symmetric encryption scheme Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) with
message space M is semantically secure if for every PPT adversary A we have:∣∣∣∣∣Pr[GsemΠ,A(λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ) ,
where GsemΠ,A(λ) is defined in the following way:
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Setup: The challenger runs sk←$Gen(1λ).
Challenge: The adversary specifies a messagem0 ∈ M. The challenger picks a random bit b
∗ ∈
{0, 1}. If b∗ = 0, then it computes c∗←$Enc(sk,m0); otherwise, it sets c
∗←$Encsk(m1),
where m1←$M. The challenger returns c
∗ to A.
Guess: The adversary outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = b∗ return 1; otherwise return 0.
3.4 Signature Scheme
A signature scheme with message spaceM is made of the following polynomial-time algorithms.
KGen(1λ): The randomized key generation algorithm takes the security parameter and outputs
a secret and a public key (sk, pk).
Sign(sk,m): The randomized signing algorithm takes as input the secret key sk and a message
m ∈ M, and produces a signature σ.
Vrfy(pk,m, σ): The deterministic verification algorithm takes as input the public key pk, a
message m, and a signature σ, and it returns a decision bit.
A signature scheme is correct if honestly generated signatures always verify correctly.
Definition 3.4 (Correctness of signatures). A signature scheme Π = (KGen,Sign,Vrfy) with
message space M is correct if ∀λ ∈ N and ∀m ∈ M, the following holds:
Pr
[
Vrfy(pk,m,Sign(sk,m)) = 1
∣∣∣ (sk, pk)←$KGen(1λ) ] = 1.
As for security we are interested in existential unforgeability, i.e, it must be infeasible to
forge a valid signature on a new fresh message.
Definition 3.5 (Unforgeability of signatures). A signature scheme Π = (KGen,Sign,Vrfy) is
existentially unforgeable under chosen-message attacks if for all PPT adversaries A:
Pr
[
GeufΠ,A(λ) = 1
]
≤ negl(λ) ,
where GeufΠ,A(λ) is the following experiment:
Setup: The challenger runs (sk, pk)←$KGen(1λ) and gives pk to A.
Query: The adversary has access to a signing oracle OSign(·). On input m, the challenger
computes and returns σ←$ Sign(sk,m). Let QSign denote the the messages queried to the
signing oracle.
Forgery: The adversary outputs (m,σ). If m 6∈ QSign, and Vrfy(pk,m, σ) = 1, output 1, else
output 0.
4 Deterministic Hierarchical Key Assignment
In this section we first introduce hierarchical key assignment (HKA) schemes [3] and then
we define a new HKA scheme, entirely deterministic, that we use as a building block in our
construction of Arcula. A hierarchical key assignment scheme is a mechanism designed to
assign a set of cryptographic keys to a set of users (or, equivalently, to a set of classes of users).
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It starts from an access hierarchy (e.g., a directed acyclic graph) representing the access rights:
A path from a node vi to a node vj implies that the user of class vi, higher in the hierarchy,
can assume the same access rights of vj. Equivalently, the access graph defines a partial order
over the users of the hierarchy, where vi ≥ vj indicates that vi has higher access privileges than
vj . The goal of a hierarchical key assignment scheme is to enforce the access hierarchy while
minimizing the number of keys distributed to the users. HKA schemes share some similarities
with hierarchical deterministic wallets. Both mechanisms assign a set of cryptographic keys to
the users of a hierarchy; users of an HKA can derive the cryptographic keys of other users lower
in the hierarchy, while users of a hierarchical deterministic wallet aim at signing transactions
on their behalf. Despite their similarities, HKA schemes have never been leveraged before to
build hierarchical deterministic wallets. To this end, HKA schemes provide several advantages:
They have been studied in depth in prior work, are provably secure, and efficient. They can
enforce arbitrarily complex access hierarchies (in comparison to the tree hierarchy of BIP32),
and consider temporal constraints. For these reasons, a contribution of this work is defining
a hierarchical key assignment scheme that is suitable for building hierarchical deterministic
wallets.
Typically, HKA schemes sample the cryptographic secrets of the hierarchy at random instead
of generating them deterministically as required by Property 2.2. In this work, instead, we design
a deterministic hierarchical key assignment (DHKA) scheme where every cryptographic secret
is derived from a seed provided by the user. To do so, we propose a deterministic version of
the efficient HKA developed by Atallah et al. [3] that is secure under key indistinguishability
(and as a consequence guarantees Property 2.1 by design). Section 5 shows how we leverage the
DHKA scheme as a building block of Arcula.
4.1 Security model
A deterministic hierarchical key assignment scheme is defined as follows (we adhere to the
definitions of HKA of Atallah et al.[3]). Let G = (V,E) be a directed acyclic graph (DAG)
representing an access hierarchy. We define the set of ancestors Anc(vi, G) = {vj | vj  w vi}
of a node vi to be the set of nodes vj such that there exists a direct path w from vj to vi in G.
Analogously, the set of descendants of node vj as Desc(vi, G) = {vj | vi  w vj } includes any
node vj such that there exists a path w from vi to vj in G. When the graph G is clear in a
particular context we omit it from the parameters of the functions Anc(vi) and Desc(vi).
A Deterministic Hierarchical Key Assignment (DHKA) scheme with seed space S is com-
posed of the following polynomial-time algorithms:
Set(1λ, G, S−1): The deterministic setup algorithm takes as input the security parameter, a
DAG G = (V,E), and an initial seed S−1 ∈ S, and outputs two mappings: 1) a public
mapping Pub : V ∪E → {0, 1}∗, associating a public label li to each node vi in G and a pub-
lic information yij to each edge (vi, vj) ∈ E; 2) a secret mapping Sec : V → {0, 1}
λ×{0, 1}λ,
associating a secret information Si and a cryptographic key xi to each node vi in G. (No
secret information is associated to the edges).
Derive(G,Pub, vi, vj , Si): The deterministic derivation algorithm takes as input the access graph
G, the public information Pub, a source node vi, a target node vj , and the secret infor-
mation Si of node vi. It outputs the cryptographic key xj associated to node vj if
vj ∈ Desc(vi).
The correctness of a DHKA scheme requires that any user vi should be able to derive,
correctly, the secret key xj of any user vj ∈ Desc(vj) lower in the hierarchy.
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Definition 4.1 (Correctness of DHKA). A DHKA Π = (Set,Derive) with seed space S is
correct if for every DAG G = (V,E), ∀λ ∈ N, ∀vi ∈ V , ∀vj ∈ Desc(vi), ∀S−1 ∈ S:
Pr[xj = Derive(G,Pub, vi, vj , Si)] = 1,
where (Pub,Sec) = Set(1λ, G, S−1), (Si, xi) = Sec(vi), and (Sj , xj) = Sec(vj).
We now formalize the security level of the scheme. We adapt the security definition originally
defined by Atallah et al. [3] to account for the determinism in our scheme.
Definition 4.2 (Key Indistinguishability of DHKA). A DHKA Π = (Set,Derive) with seed
space S is key indistinguishable if for every PPT adversary A and every DAG G = (V,E):∣∣∣∣Pr[Gsk−indΠ,A (λ,G) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ) ,
where Gsk−indΠ,A (λ,G) is defined in the following way:
Setup: The challenger receives a challenge node v∗ ∈ V from the adversary A. The challenger
samples S−1←$S, then runs Set(1
λ, G, S−1), and gives the resulting public information
Pub to the adversary A. The challenger samples a random bit b∗←$ {0, 1}: If b∗ = 0,
it returns to A the cryptographic key xv∗ associated to node v
∗; otherwise, it returns a
random key x¯v∗ of the corresponding length.
Query: The adversary has access to a corrupt oracle OCorr(·). On input vi /∈ Anc(v
∗), the
challenger retrieves (Si, xi) = Sec(vi) and sends Si to A.
Guess: The adversary outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = b∗ return 1; otherwise return 0.
Remark. We note that the adversary A depicted in Gsk−indΠ,A (λ,G) is a static adversary who
chooses the challenge node v∗ before the experiment begins. Ateniese et al. [5, Theorem 1], how-
ever, prove that any hierarchical key assignment scheme secure (in the sense of Gsk−indΠ,A (λ,G))
against a static attacker is also secure against an adaptive attacker, i.e., against an adversary
that adaptively chooses the challenge node v∗. The authors prove that the two security models
are polynomially equivalent since there exists a reduction between the static and the adaptive ad-
versaries. The static adversary can simply guess the challenge node v∗ of the adaptive adversary
and abort the simulation if the guess is incorrect. For these reasons, we discuss the security of
any DHKA scheme only in the setting of a static attacker.
4.2 The DHKA scheme
This section describes the implementation of our deterministic hierarchical key assignment
scheme over any DAG G encoding an access hierarchy.
We assume, without loss of generality, that: 1) There exists a unique root node v0 ∈ V of
G, i.e. the most-privileged node of the hierarchy encoded by G that can derive the keys of any
other node. For any DAG G, it is always possible to elect a root node v0. Since G is a DAG,
v0 shall be one of the minimal nodes in a topological ordering of G and, equivalently, v0 shall
have no ancestors. If two or more nodes vj have no ancestors, then it is always possible to
construct a new graph G′ = (V ∪{v0} , E∪{(v0, vj) | vj has no ancestors}) such that the access
hierarchy encoded by G′ is equivalent to the one of G, where the new node v0 in G
′ is the root
of the graph (and has no associated users). 2) That every node vj has a fixed parent node in
the hierarchy, i.e. a node vi such that the edge (vi, vj) ∈ E. As an example, we fix the parent
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node vj of vi to be the first ancestor of vi in any ordering of the nodes of the graph G (e.g.,
obtained with a depth-first-search of the graph) such that (vi, vj) ∈ E.
At a high level, we build on the randomized hierarchical key assignment scheme of Atallah
et al. [3] where each node vi of the hierarchy is identified by a random label li and holds a
random secret information Si, that it will use to generate its own cryptographic key and to
derive the keys of the nodes lower in the hierarchy. In our scheme, we modify the original
design so that both the label li and the secret information Si are deterministic. We label each
node through its index1 (i.e., li = vi) and we derive its secret information Si deterministically
(through a pseudorandom function) from the secret information of its parent. We formally
define our implementation of DHKA as follows.
Construction 1. Let {Fk}k∈Kλ and E = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be respectively a family of pseudoran-
dom functions and a symmetric key encryption scheme. Let G = (V,E) be a directed acyclic
graph representing an access hierarchy. We build a DHKA scheme in the following way:
Set(1λ, G, S−1): On input the security parameter, a directed acyclic graph G = (V,E), and an
initial seed S−1, the algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. Compute S0 = FS−1(11‖l0) for v0 ∈ V , where l0 = v0 and v0 is the root of the
directed acyclic graph G.
2. For each vertex vi ∈ V and vj ∈ V such that vj is the parent of vi, compute
Si = FSj (11‖li) where li = vi.
3. For each vertex vi ∈ V compute ti = FSi(00‖li) and xi = FSi(01‖li).
4. For each edge (vi, vj) ∈ E, compute rij = Fti(10‖lj) and yij ←$Encrij (tj‖xj).
2
Finally, the algorithm returns the public mapping Pub : V ∪ E → {0, 1}∗ and the secret
mapping Sec : V → {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}λ, defined as:
Pub : vi 7→ li Pub : (vi, vj) 7→ yij
Sec : vi 7→ (Si, xi)
Derive(G,Pub, vi, vj , Si): On input a directed acyclic graph G = (V,E), a public mapping Pub,
two nodes vi, vj ∈ V , and a seed Si, the algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. If there is no path from vi to vj in G, return ⊥;
2. If i = j, retrieve li from Pub and return xj = FSi(01‖li);
3. Otherwise, compute ti = FSi(00‖li) and set i¯ = i and t¯i = ti; then
(a) Let j¯ be the successor of i¯ in the path from vi to vj.
(b) Retrieve lj¯ and yi¯j¯ from Pub
(c) Compute ri¯j¯ = Ft¯i(10‖lj¯) and tj¯‖xj¯ = Decri¯j¯(yi¯j¯).
(d) Set i¯ = j¯ and t¯i = tj¯ .
(e) If j¯ = j then return xj ; otherwise repeat from Item 3a.
The proposed key assignment scheme is entirely deterministic. In particular, it differs from
the design of Atallah et al. at the Items 1 and 2 of the Set algorithm in Construction 1. The
original key assignment scheme draws the values li and Si (respectively, l0 and S0) at random.
In our case, instead, we deterministically derive them from the identifier vi of the node and
from the secret information Sj of its parent vj (respectively, from the seed S−1).
1 We will extend the node labels with a version number when handling dynamic changes to the hierarchy of
the DHKA. We refer the reader to Section 7 for more details.
2We implicitly assume that the PRF output space and the symmetric encryption key space have the same
distribution. In alternative, rij can be used as randomness of key generation algorithm Gen.
11
Computation and space complexity The efficiency of the scheme is linear in time and
space, respectively, to the key derivation distance and the size of the graph. Let w be the
shortest path between vi and vj ∈ Desc(vi): Deriving xj by starting from Si requires |w|
invocations F and |w| invocations of Dec. For space complexity, each node vi in V is required
to store a single secret Si—the private storage required by each node is proportional to the
size λ of the security parameter. On the other hand, the public information holds the mapping
between nodes and labels and the encrypted information associated with each edge. As such,
the overall space required is linear to λ|V | + λ|E|. That said, we note that in our case the
mapping between nodes and labels is the identity function and that we can further reduce the
storage requirements by leveraging the deterministic derivation: Any parent node vj can directly
derive the secret information Si of its descendant vi and, for this reason, we can avoid storing any
encrypted information on the edge that connects them. As a result, we can reduce the size of the
encrypted information on the edges and only store them for any node vi such that there exists
an edge (vi, vj) ∈ E and vi is not the parent of vj and as such cannot deterministically derive
the secret value Sj by starting from its own secret value Si. With this optimization in place,
our scheme is comparable to a tree-based hierarchical key assignment scheme [8] where we store
the additional derivation keys as encrypted information on the edges instead of storing them
as secrets within each node that requires them. Finally, if the key generation and derivation
processes happen on the fly (i.e., when the entire process starts from the seed), then the only
private storage required is proportional to the length of the initial seed S−1, i.e., to the length
of the security parameter λ.
Remark. At first glance, it might seem that fixing the randomness of the Set algorithm of
the HKA by Atallah et al. [3] is sufficient to enforce its determinism. We remark here that
such solution, alone, does not guarantee this result. When we fix the randomness of the Set
algorithm of the HKA we are implicitly fixing an ordering on the sampling of the secret values
Si of each node vi: Sampling at random Si before Sj, as opposed to sampling Sj before Si,
will result in different secret values assigned to each node. For this reason, the HKA with fixed
randomness would also require additional public information about the ordering of the nodes of
the hierarchy. Our DHKA, instead, deterministically generates the secret values according to
the structure of the hierarchy and not to any ordering of its nodes. This approach allows us
to design a deterministic scheme that does not require any additional public information and
that, furthermore, can take the determinism into account to reduce the amount of encrypted
information stored on the edges of the hierarchy.
We conclude this section by establishing the following result, that we prove in Appendix A.1.
Theorem 4.1. Let {Fk}k∈Kλ and E = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be respectively a pseudorandom function
family and a symmetric encryption scheme. If {Fk}k∈Kλ is pseudorandom (Definition 3.1) and
E is semantically secure (Definition 3.3), then the DKHA scheme Π from Construction 1 is key
indistinguishable.
5 Arcula: Secure Hierarchical Deterministic Wallets
The goal of a hierarchical deterministic wallet (HDW) is to assign a set of signing keys to the
users of a hierarchy so that each node can sign transactions on behalf of its children, but can not
escalate its privileges to sign transactions on behalf of any node higher in the hierarchy. Also,
an HDW requires the public key of a child node to depend exclusively on the public key of its
parent and do not require any additional secret information. Combining all these properties at
once has proved in the past to be a challenging task. As it happens in BIP32, enabling public
key derivation seems to expose the wallet to privilege escalation inevitably.
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Arcula, our new design of hierarchical deterministic wallet, solves this issue while satisfying
the three properties all at once. It is secure to key recovery, it deterministically derives the
private and public information from an initial seed, and it enables public key derivation (e.g.,
to generate new public keys in an untrusted environment or to allow the optional auditing of the
wallet funds). On a high level, Arcula is defined over 5 algorithms (Set,DPub,DPriv,Sign,Vrfy)
that setup the wallet parameters, enable the derivation of the private and public signing keys of
the nodes of the hierarchy and implement the creation and the verification of signatures. More
in details: 1) Set deterministically instantiates the wallet by generating a single master public
key mpk and a set of master secret keys mski, one for each node of the hierarchy. 2) DPriv and
DPub are responsible for the secret and public key derivation. DPriv derives the secret signing
key ski of a node vj descendent of a node vi by using the master secret key associated to vi,
mski (Property 2.2) whereas DPub derives the public key pki of a node vi by starting from the
master public key mpk (Property 2.3). 3) Sign and Vrfy are the standard signing and verification
algorithms. The following sections first provide a formal definition of hierarchical deterministic
wallets and then detail our implementation of Arcula.
5.1 Security Model
A hierarchical deterministic wallet (HDW) Π = (Set,DPub,DPriv,Sign,Vrfy), defined over a
seed space S and message space M is defined in the following way:
Set(1λ, G, S−1): The deterministic setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter, an
access graph G = (V,E), and an initial seed S−1 ∈ S, and outputs a set of master secret
keys {mski}vi∈V , a master public key mpk.
DPub(mpk, vi): The deterministic public derivation algorithm takes as input the master public
key mpk, a target node vi, and outputs the public key pki associated to node vi.
DPriv(mpk,mski, vi, vj): The deterministic private derivation algorithm takes as input the mas-
ter public key mpk, master secret key mski of node vi, and a target node vj ∈ Desc(vi),
and outputs the secret key skj associated to node vj.
Sign(ski,m): The randomized signing algorithm takes as input a message m ∈ M, and a secret
key ski, and outputs a signature σ.
Vrfy(pki,m, σ): The deterministic verification algorithm takes as input a public key pki, a mes-
sage m, and a signature σ, and outputs a decisional bit b.
A hierarchical deterministic wallet is correct if any user can derive the private and public key
of its descendants and create a valid signature on behalf of them. More in details, we say that
a HDW is correct if any node vi can derive the signing key skj of any node vj ∈ Desc(vi) and
produce, in turn, a valid signature σ on behalf of vj (i.e., that passes the verification process
against the public key pkj obtained through public key derivation).
Definition 5.1 (Correctness of HDW). A hierarchical deterministic wallet Π = (Set,DPub,DPriv,
Sign,Vrfy), with seed space S and message space M, is correct if for every DAG G = (V,E),
∀vi ∈ V, ∀vj ∈ Desc(vi), ∀S−1 ∈ S,∀m ∈ M the following conditions holds:
Pr
[
Vrfy(pkj ,m,Sign(skj,m)) = 1
]
≥ 1− negl(λ) ,
where ({mski}vi∈V ,mpk) = Set(1
λ, G, S−1), skj = DPriv(mpk,mski, vi, vj), and pkj = DPub(mpk,
vj).
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Remark. Arcula shares a significant number of similarities with hierarchical identity-based
cryptography. Its public derivation, indeed, takes as input the identity of a target node ( e.g.,
vi) and the master public key mpk to output the public key pki. Nonetheless, we point out
some fundamental differences. Most hierarchical identity-based signature schemes leverage a
number of public parameters and rely on bilinear mappings. For this reason, these solutions
are unpractical in the existing blockchains. The public parameters of each instantiation of the
scheme should be stored on the blockchain itself and, in addition, the underlying protocol should
handle the bilinear mappings efficiently. Our design of Arcula, on the other hand, explicitly
takes the blockchain into consideration. We do not rely on bilinear mappings, and we only store
a portion of the master public key mpk (typically a single group element) on the blockchain.
From the security point of view, we take inspiration from existentially unforgeable signatures.
We allow an attacker to corrupt an arbitrary number of nodes in the hierarchy and we provide
him with a signing oracle to obtain signatures on arbitrary messages from any uncorrupted node
(i.e., every node that is not a descendant of a corrupt one). Then, we challenge the attacker to
forge a signature for a fresh message on behalf of an uncorrupted node.
Definition 5.2 (Hierarchical existential unforgeability of HDW). A hierarchical deterministic
wallet is hierarchically existentially unforgeable under chosen-message attacks if for every DAG
G = (V,E) and PPT adversary A the following condition holds:
Pr
[
GheufΠ,A (λ,G) = 1
]
≤ negl(λ) ,
where experiment GheufΠ,A (λ,G)is defined in the following way:
Setup: The challenger samples a random S−1←$S and executes ({mski}vi∈V ,mpk) = Set(1
λ, G,
S−1). It gives the master public key mpk to A.
Query: The adversary A has access to the following oracles:
OCorr(·): On input vi ∈ V , the challenger answers by giving mski to A. Let QCorr denote
the set of nodes vi that A corrupted, including their descendants Desc(vi).
OSign(·, ·): On input (m, vi) ∈ M×V , the challenger returns σ←$Signski(m) where ski =
DPriv(mpk,msk0, v0, vi). Let QSign denote the pairs (m, vi) for which A queried the
oracle OSign.
Forgery: A outputs a forgery (vi,m, σ). If Vrfypki(m,σ) = 1 where pki = DPub(mpk, vi) and
vi /∈ QCorr, (m, vi) /∈ QSign, return 1; otherwise return 0.
5.2 Arcula from DHKA and signatures
This section describes our implementation of hierarchical deterministic wallet from a DHKA
and a signature scheme. We start from an initial seed to deterministically generate a global
pair of cold storage keys (wsk,wpk) and a pair of signing keys (sk′i, pk
′
i) associated to each node
vi of the wallet. The cold storage secret key wsk is designed to be stored in a safe environment
(e.g., offline). The signing keys, instead, are generated through a key indistinguishable DHKA
scheme and enable nodes to sign transactions on behalf of their descendants in the hierarchy
while guaranteeing security against key recovery attacks. We identify the nodes of the wallet
vi according to the cold storage public key wpk and to their public label li and, as a result, we
achieve public key derivation by design. Then, we bind the identity of an Arcula node to their
the signing key pair (sk′i, pk
′
i) through a certificate, signed by the cold storage secret key wsk,
that explicitly authorizes the signing key sk′i to spend the coins destined to the node vi.
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In practice, in a blockchain-based crypto-system, we leverage the cold storage public key wpk
and the public label li of a node as an address for receiving payments. Users spend their funds
by signing transactions through their signing key sk′i and by presenting, at the same time, the
certificate provided by the cold storage that authorizes them to spend funds. This approach has
several advantages: Receiving funds does not require the certificate—all we need is the address
of the destination node, i.e. the cold storage public key wpk and the public node label li; a
user only requires her certificate when spending funds for the first time, i.e., when she signs a
transaction through her secret key sk′i; the creation of the certificate that authorizes the signing
key sk′i to spend the coins of node vi can happen entirely offline (i.e., in cold storage). On
the other hand, if a user does not require the public derivation property, she can also leverage
her signing public key pk′i directly as a pseudonym address on which to receive funds and then
spend them through the corresponding private key sk′i. These signing keys, generated by the
DHKA, are indistinguishable and, as a consequence, this approach guarantees the unlinkability
of the users within the wallet and disables the public address derivation (Property 2.3).
More in details, the Set algorithm deterministically generates a master public key mpk,
that we use for the public derivation, and that holds the public cold storage key wpk and the
certificates authorizing the signing keys sk′i, and a master secret key mski associated to each node
vi, that we use to derive their signing keys sk
′
i. The DPriv and DPub algorithms respectively
derive the signing secret keys (through the DHKA scheme) and the corresponding public keys
(by combining the public cold storage key wpk and the node identifiers). Finally, the Sign and
the Vrfy algorithms handle the creation and the verification of digital signatures. Any node vi
runs the Sign algorithm with its signing key sk′i to create a signature and the Vrfy algorithm
checks that there exists a certificate authorizing sk′i to spend funds on behalf of the node vi
(identified by li) under the cold storage key wsk of the wallet. Formally:
Construction 2. Let Γ = (SetΓ,DeriveΓ) and Σ = (KGenΣ,SignΣ,VrfyΣ) be respectively a
DHKA and a signatures signature scheme. We build Arcula in the following way:
Set(1λ, G, S−1): On input the security parameter, a DAG G = (V,E), and a seed S−1 ∈ S the
algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. Let S0−1, S
1
−1 ∈ {0, 1}
|S−1 |/2 be respectively the most significant and least significant
part of S−1. Compute (Pub,Sec) = SetΓ(1
λ, G, S0−1) and (wsk,wpk) = KGenΣ(1
λ;S1−1).
2. For each node vi ∈ V :
(a) Let (Si, xi) = Sec(vi) and set mski = Si.
(b) (sk′i, pk
′
i) = KGenΣ(1
λ;xi).
(c) Compute σˆi←$SignΣ(wsk, (pk
′
i, li)) where li = Pub(vi).
3. Output {mski}vi∈V and mpk = (G,Pub,{σˆi}vi∈V ,wpk).
DPub(mpk, vj): On input the master public key mpk = (G,Pub,{σˆi}vi∈V ,wpk) and a node
vj ∈ V , the algorithm returns pkj = (wpk, lj) where lj = Pub(vj).
DPriv(mpk,mski, vi, vj): On input the master public key mpk = (G,Pub,{σˆi}vi∈V ,wpk), the
master secret key mski = Si, two nodes vi ∈ V, vj ∈ Desc(vi), the algorithm runs
xj = DeriveΓ(G,Pub, vi, vj , Si) and (sk
′
j , pk
′
j) = KGenΣ(1
λ;xj). Finally, it returns skj =
(sk′j , pk
′
j, σˆj).
Sign(ski,m): On input a signing key ski = (sk
′
i, pk
′
i, σˆi) and a message m, the algorithms returns
σ = (pk′i, σ
′, σˆi) where σ
′←$ SignΣ(sk
′
i,m).
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Vrfy(pki,m, σ): On input a public key pki = (wpk, li), a message m, and a signature σ =
(pk′i, σ
′, σˆi), the algorithms returns 1 if VrfyΣ(wpk, (pk
′
i, li), σˆi) = 1 and VrfyΣ(pk
′
i,m, σ
′) =
1; otherwise it returns 0.
The correctness of the scheme comes directly from the correctness of the underlying primi-
tives. As for security, we establish the following result whose proof appears in Appendix A.2.
Theorem 5.1. Let Γ = (SetΓ,DeriveΓ) and Σ = (KGenΣ,SignΣ,VrfyΣ) be respectively a de-
terministic hierarchical key assignment and a signature scheme. If Γ is key indistinguishable
(Definition 4.2) and Σ is existentially unforgeable (Definition 3.5), then the HDW Π from Con-
struction 2 is hierarchically existentially unforgeable (Definition 5.2).
In the context of the three-levels security models defined in Section 2, the public derivation
of Arcula does not assume any level of trust and, as such, belongs to the Untrusted Envi-
ronment. An Arcula public key is, indeed, the concatenation of two public values: The cold
storage key wpk and the identifier li of node vi. Redeeming the coins destined to an Arcula
node vi assumes instead the Warm Environment. The certificate σˆi that authorizes it to
spend the funds through the public key pk′i is a public parameter of the wallet, but we require
the node’s private signing key sk′i to sign a new transaction. Compromising the secrets of node
vi in this environment leads to compromising all its descendants, but none of the other nodes.
Finally, the secret key wsk must be safely stored within the context of the Cold Storage. We
leverage this key wsk only during the setup of the wallet, i.e. when we sign and release the
authorization certificate σˆi associated to a identifier li of a node vi (e.g., when we run the Set
algorithm). Such secret key is critical to the security of the wallet, as an attacker can use it to
forge a certificate that associates any pair of keys to any target node and spend the coins of the
entire wallet.
To summarize, Arcula defines a hierarchical deterministic wallet that benefits from the
following properties:
1. Is secure against key recovery attacks (Property 2.1).
2. Generates every cryptographic key from an initial seed (Property 2.2).
3. Enables public-key derivation so that nodes can derive the public keys of their children
without accessing their own private keys (see Property 2.3).
4. Enables secret-key derivation so that nodes can sign a transaction on behalf of their
descendants.
5. Does not rely on any particular digital signature scheme.
6. The DHKA at the core of Arcula is secure under key indistinguishability and handles any
directed acyclic graph encoding a partially ordered hierarchy. In addition, it allows to
dynamically modify the hierarchy (i.e., by adding or removing nodes, as we detail in Sec-
tion 7) and to control the assignment according to some temporal constraints (Section 8).
6 Arcula in the real world
With Arcula, we aim at achieving two goals at the same time. First, to design a hierarchical
deterministic wallet that is secure against privilege escalation, and that is suitable for any mod-
ern blockchain-based crypto-system. Also, to create an HDW that can be used in practice and
that supports the most widely used crypto-systems of today. To this end, we constrain our
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design with as few cryptographic assumptions as possible. Arcula works with any existentially
unforgeable signature scheme and only requires the verification of a signature on an arbitrary
message (i.e., the certificate provided by the cold storage that authorizes the signing key of a
user). This design makes it immediately compatible with the Ethereum blockchain, that im-
plements a Turing-complete language, and with all the forks based on Bitcoin that allow the
signature verification of arbitrary messages (e.g., Bitcoin Cash). The original Bitcoin implemen-
tation, instead, does not allow such operation (in fact, it goes as far as disabling the operations
of string concatenation and integer multiplication that, originally, it allowed). We first focus on
how to spend and receive funds, out of the box, on the Bitcoin Cash blockchain; then, we discuss
the modifications that would make it compatible with the original Bitcoin protocol; finally, we
compare the properties that Arcula achieves against those of BIP32.
6.1 Technical Implementation
Our open-source implementation of Arcula is available online3. We define the hash function
H(x) to be SHA3-256(x) and we implement the pseudorandom function Fk(x) = H(k‖x). The
symmetric encryption scheme E required by our Deterministic Hierarchical Key Assignment
scheme Γ is the authenticated encryption scheme AES256 with Galois/Counter Mode (GCM).
We generate a hierarchal deterministic wallet based on the tree structure defined in BIP43 and
BIP44 [15, 16], where the keys to different crypto-coins correspond to different subtrees, and
each branch of the subtrees is a chain associated to a single account that contains multiple
receiving addresses. We obtain an initial seed S−1 of 512 bits by following the specification of
BIP39 [17] that generates a seed from a random mnemonic sequence. We generate the wallet
that we use in our tests by fixing the randomness of the mnemonic generation process to the
result of the operation H(correct horse battery staple).
6.2 Bitcoin Cash
This section shows how to send and receive funds while using Arcula in Bitcoin Cash or in any
Bitcoin-based blockchain that implements the verification of signatures on arbitrary messages.
Bitcoin Scripts A Bitcoin transaction is a cryptographically signed statement that transfers
some coins from a sender to a receiver. The sender of the coins signs the transaction through
her secret key to spend, in turn, the coins destined to the corresponding public key. Every
transaction specifies a locking and an unlocking script. These scripts respectively state the
necessary conditions to spend, in a future transaction, the coins being transferred (i.e., their
locking condition) and provide the information required to redeem them (i.e., to unlock them
as a result of a past transaction). Both scripts are written through a stack-based language that
allows simple mathematical operations, stack manipulations, and enables simple cryptographic
primitives (i.e. computing the result of a hash function and verifying a signature).
A typical Bitcoin locking script specifies the address of the receiver (usually through the hash
of its public key) and requires him to provide a valid signature in order to redeem the coins being
transferred. More in details, the locking and unlocking scripts of a standard Bitcoin transaction
are defined as follows. Uppercase monospace words indicate operations of the Bitcoin scripting
language, while angular brackets enclose variable inputs.
Locking: OP DUP OP HASH160 <H(pk)> OP EQUALVERIFY OP CHECKSIG
Unlocking: <σ> <pk>
3 Available at https://github.com/aldur/Arcula.
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Address type Locking Script Unlocking Script Total
Standard 24 106 130
Arcula 43 179 222
Table 1: The script bytes sizes of a transaction to a standard Bitcoin address and to an Arcula
address.
Together, these scripts ensure that the public key pk provided in the unlocking script is the
pre-image of the hash H(pk) (the Bitcoin address) contained in the locking script; then, verify
the validity of the transaction signature σ under the public key pk.
In Arcula, instead, we identify the nodes of our wallet vi according to the cold storage
public key wpk and to their public label li. For this reason, an Arcula address is simply the
concatenation of the byte representations of these values, that we encode in the locking script.
The unlocking script, on the other hand, contains the certificate σˆi = SignΣ(wsk, (pk
′
i, li)), signed
by the cold storage secret key wsk and associating the signing public key pk′i to the node vi with
label li, and a signature σ of the transaction under the public signing key pk
′
i. More in details,
with Arcula the locking and the unlocking scripts respectively become:
Locking: OP DUP OP TOALTSTACK <li> OP CAT <wpk> OP CHECKDATASIGVERIFY
OP FROMALTSTACK OP CHECKSIG
Unlocking: <σ> <σˆi> <pk
′
i>
The two scripts: 1) Verify that the certificate σˆi is a valid signature of the message (pk
′
i, li)
under the wallet public key wpk; 2) verify the validity of the transaction signature σ under
the signing public key pk′i. In particular, the locking script checks the validity of the certificate
through the operation OP CHECKDATASIGVERIFY, which allows the stack-based scripting language
to validate a signature of an arbitrary message (the concatenation of pk′i and li obtained through
the operation OP CAT). The scripting language of the original Bitcoin does not implement such
operation yet. Nonetheless, a significant portion of the Bitcoin community believes that its
adoption would provide substantial benefits to the entire system, e.g., by enabling third-parties
to store and verify independent messages on the blockchain. For this reason, many Bitcoin forks
(Bitcoin Cash, Bitcoin Ultimate, and Blockstream to name a few), that aim at modernizing
the protocol and at improving the stack-based language used in scripts, now implement this
operation.
In our experiments, we focus, as an example, on Bitcoin Cash—the sixth crypto-currency
by market capitalization at the time of writing—and we evaluate Arcula on its test blockchain.
We first create a transaction4 that locks 0.5 BCH (the Bitcoin Cash crypto-coin) to a node of
our wallet of Section 6.1, identified through the cold storage public key wpk (also in the locking
script) and the integer label 3. Next, we redeem the coins through a second transaction that
provides the transaction signature σ of the secret key ski, an appropriate certificate σˆi signed
by the cold storage key wsk, and the public signing key pk′i. We create both the signature and
the certificate through the ECDSA signatures scheme on the secp256k1 elliptic curve used in
Bitcoin, and we encode the integer label of the node vi with 4 bytes.
Transaction Costs To study the costs of Bitcoin transactions to an Arcula address, we
analyze the amount of storage that they require on the blockchain. Every Bitcoin transaction
4The transcripts of the transactions are available, respectively, at https://bit.ly/2UI62tt and
https://bit.ly/2UoQNGI.
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devolves a small amount of fees to the system to incentive its inclusion in the next block of the
chain. Fees are usually measured in coins per byte and, for this reason, the size of a transaction
on the Bitcoin wire protocol is directly related to the amount of fees that it should pay to
be included in the blockchain. In particular, the length of the locking and unlocking scripts
influences directly the final transaction cost. Table 1 compares the sizes, in bytes, of the locking
and unlocking scripts of standard Bitcoin transactions and to an address of our wallet. Every
operation of the stack-based scripting language is encoded with a single byte; a standard Bitcoin
address is the result of a hash function that outputs 20 bytes; the ECDSA signature and the
public key in the unlocking script require, respectively, 73 and 33 bytes. By summing these
values up, we find that the locking script of a transaction to a standard Bitcoin address is 24
bytes long (4 script operations plus the receiver address) while the unlocking scripts take 106
bytes (the ECDSA signature and its associated public key). In Arcula, on the other hand, the
locking script encodes 6 operations, the identifier of a node (that we encode with 4 bytes), and
the cold storage public key (33 bytes, as opposed to its 20 bytes hash), for a total of 43 bytes.
The unlocking script, instead, contains two ECDSA signatures (one for the transaction and one
for the certificate) and the signing public key; as a result, it is 179 bytes long. Overall, the size
of the locking and unlocking scripts for a transaction to an Arcula address is 222 bytes, 70%
longer than the standard address counterparts.
In particular, the Bitcoin users aim at minimizing the size of the locking script, as its
associated fees will be paid by the sender of the transaction, e.g., the customer of an online
service, and the service providers usually aim at minimizing these costs. Bitcoin solves this issue
through the pay to script hash mechanism, proposed in BIP16 [1], that reduces the size of any
locking script to a constant at the cost of longer unlocking scripts. The intuition is that instead
of specifying the full locking script, the users can constrain the coins of a transaction by locking
them to the hash of the original script; then, in the unlocking script, they can provide both
the pre-image of the hash, i.e., the full locking script, and its required inputs. This approach
brings several advantages. First, any locking script can be expressed with a constant byte size
that results in a fixed cost for the sender. Second, it hides the details of the locking script until
the users reveal the pre-image of the hash in an unlocking script, i.e. when they redeem the
coins sent by the transaction. Finally, the Bitcoin protocol proposes a way to encode the pay to
script hash locking scripts into standard Bitcoin addresses, so that exchanging transactions of
this kind is entirely transparent to the software used by the sender. By using the pay to script
hash mechanism, any user can send a transaction to an Arcula address through her favorite
Bitcoin wallet, in a transparent way that does not require any specific software modification to
it. More in details, an Arcula pay to script hash transaction is defined as follows, where the
script that we input to the hash function is the locking script of a transaction to an Arcula
address that we have seen before:
Script: OP DUP OP TOALTSTACK <li> OP CAT <wpk> OP CHECKDATASIGVERIFY
OP FROMALTSTACK OP CHECKSIG
Locking: OP HASH160 <H(Script)> OP EQUAL
Unlocking: <σ> <σˆi> <pk
′
i> <Script>
The pay to script hash mechanism reduces to 22 bytes (2 operations and a 20 bytes hash)
the size of the locking script and, equivalently, the amount of fees that users have to spend to
send funds to an Arcula address. The size of the unlocking script, on the other hand, affects
the fees that the users of Arcula need to pay when spending their coins. In particular, when
using pay to script hash, this amount of fees is slightly larger than the one required for a
traditional Bitcoin transaction. In many cases, however, the benefits that arise with Arcula
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justify the increase in the transaction cost. We take as an example an online marketplace that
handles incoming and outgoing payments through the blockchain. First, the determinism of
Arcula guarantees that even on catastrophic hardware failure the service provider will be able
to recover the entire wallet and all its signing keys. Besides, Arcula’s public key derivation
allows her to dynamically derive new addresses (e.g., one for each product of her catalog) in an
entirely untrusted environment (e.g., an online web-server) while keeping all her signing keys
at rest in trusted storage. As a result, the provider obtains the flexibility of handling incoming
payments on dynamic addresses and minimizes the risk of losing the coins associated with them.
When compared with the financial costs associated with this risk, the additional fees required
by the Arcula transactions are only negligible. The public-key derivation also brings other
significant benefits. Many financial regulations require, indeed, companies to be accountable
for all the payments that they receive. With Arcula, an auditor can reach this goal by merely
inspecting the blockchain while looking for any address that contains the cold storage public key
wpk that identifies the company. Finally, many companies leverage m-of-n signatures, where
redeeming a transaction requires m valid signatures among n authorized public keys. Their goal
is to enforce the internal structure of the company (e.g., so that either managers or employees
can sign transactions) or to divide the responsibility of spending coins evenly. The unlocking
scripts of m-of-n transactions have considerable size: They contain m signatures and n public
keys. By leveraging Arcula and enforcing an appropriate hierarchy that reflects their internal
structure, these companies could reduce the size of the unlocking scripts to only two signatures
(the transaction signature and the certificate) and two public keys (the cold storage and signing
public keys).
Optimizations and compatibility with Bitcoin The current implementation of Arcula
does not require any modification to the underlying protocols and blockchains. Nevertheless,
we also propose a set of optimizations that, through minimal modifications to these protocols,
reduce both the cost of transactions to Arcula addresses and the amount of storage required on
the blockchain. We begin by noting that any authorization certificate σˆi can be used more than
once by the corresponding signing key pk′i. For this reason, the first optimization that we propose
is to cache the certificate σˆi as soon as it appears for the first time in an unlocking script. Then,
any subsequent transaction signed by pk′i could specify a pointer to the certificate (e.g., with a
shorter hash) instead of the certificate itself and, in turn, reduce the size of the unlocking script.
As an example, by pointing to the certificate with a 20 bytes hash, we would reduce the size
of the Arcula locking and unlocking scripts to be roughly 20 bytes longer than their traditional
counterparts. Implementing this optimization requires a new operation in the scripting language
to retrieve the certificate from the cache and to verify its validity. On the other hand, if we
allow for more complex modifications, we can change the signature scheme of the underlying
protocols to reduce these space requirements to their optimal value further—a single signature
per transaction. Arcula can be implemented with a single signature by leveraging a sanitizable
signature scheme [4], i.e. a scheme where an authorized party can modify a fraction of the
message signed without interacting with the original signer. The intuition is to provide every
user vi with a signature of the wallet secret key wsk that authorizes their signing public key pk
′
i
and that also includes an additional modifiable portion (a blank transaction). To spend their
coins, the users leverage their secret key sk′i to modify the sanitizable portion of the message
and to replace the blank transaction with the details of the new one that they intend to sign.
In their work, Ateniese et al. [4] show how to construct a sanitizable signature scheme by
combining any signature scheme with a chameleon hash function. Their construct would enable
Arcula to be also used with the traditional Bitcoin blockchain by implementing the sanitizable
signatures on top of the ECDSA signature scheme that it already uses and without changing
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the expressiveness of the Bitcoin scripting language (i.e., without requiring the verification of
a signature on an arbitrary message).
6.3 Comparison with BIP32
We compare Arcula with BIP32 by evaluating it in details at the three different security and
privacy scenarios that we present in Section 2.1. In the Public Chain Code setting, Arcula
achieves the same properties of BIP32. Indeed, when the chain code c of BIP32 is a public
parameter of the wallet, then a passive attacker can correlate together all the public keys
derived from the seed. Similarly, a passive attacker can inspect the locking scripts of any
transaction to an Arcula address and group together those of them that include the same cold
storage public key wpk. That said, Arcula shows a significant difference with BIP32: Even after
compromising an arbitrary number of signing keys, an attacker can not escalate his privileges
and spend the coins of a node higher in the hierarchy (i.e., Arcula does not suffer from the key
recovery vulnerability that we discuss in Section 2.1, Equation (1)).
On the other hand, in the Hardened Derivation scenario, BIP32 trades the public deriva-
tion property to solve the privilege escalation vulnerability. In this setting, Arcula achieves
the same properties as well. When users are not interested in public derivation and aim at
receiving payments on uncorrelated pseudonyms, they can identify nodes through their public
signing keys pk′i and ignore the wallet public keys wpk. To do so, they address standard Bitcoin
transactions (with standard costs) to their public signing keys pk′i and then sign new transac-
tions redeeming the coins through the corresponding private keys sk′i. We generate the signing
keys by leveraging our Deterministic Hierarchical Key Assignment (DHKA) scheme, which is
secure under key indistinguishability. In contrast, the security of BIP32 has never been formally
proved.
Finally, we consider the Private Chain Code scenario. Here, BIP32 leverages a private
chain code c in the key derivation process so that the public key of a child node looks uncorrelated
from the public key of its parent. This result holds against any passive attacker as long as
the chain code is private and running the public-key derivation requires the knowledge of the
private chain code. With Arcula we achieve the same result without additional requirements.
The intuition is to use the private chain code c to perturb the cold storage secret and public
keys (wsk,wpk) so that they look uncorrelated from the original keys. As a result, we obtain a
perturbed pair of cold storage keys for each node in our wallet, labeled (wski,wpki), that we use
to sign the certificate σˆi that associates the public signing key pk
′
i to vi. Then, we address any
Bitcoin payment of the node vi to the i-th perturbation wpki of the cold storage public key wpk,
that is uncorrelated from any other key of the wallet. More in details, let g be a generator of the
secp256k1 elliptic curve used in Bitcoin’s ECDSA signature scheme. Then, we know that the
public cold storage key wpk = gwsk. Let c be the secret chain code and let F be a pseudorandom
function. We create the i-th perturbation wpki of the cold storage key wpk as follows:
wpki = g
wsk+Fc(li) = gwsk · gFc(li) = wpk · gFc(li),
where li is the label of node vi. Consequently, we modify the Item 2c of Construction 2 to
sign the certificates σˆi←$ SignΣ(wski, pk
′
i) with the perturbed public key wski = wsk + Fc(li).
Note that we remove the label li from the certificate since now every pair of perturbed keys is
uniquely associated to precisely one pair of signing keys and the perturbation already takes into
explicit consider the label li of node vi. Finally, we replace the cold storage public key wpk in
the locking script with the i-th perturbed key wpki, that verifies the certificate σˆi, as follows:
Locking: OP DUP OP TOALTSTACK <wpki> OP CHECKDATASIGVERIFY
OP FROMALTSTACK OP CHECKSIG
21
Unlocking: <σ> <σˆi> <pk
′
i>
As a result, all the Arcula addresses of the same wallet look uncorrelated when they appear
in the locking script of a transaction. That said, we point out that, essentially, the perturbed
private keys wski are equivalent to the original private key wsk: An attacker that compromises a
perturbed key can invert the perturbation, recover the original cold storage key, and compromise
the entire wallet by forging new certificates for key pairs that he controls. For this reason, the
perturbed keys shall be kept in the same trusted environment of the cold storage private key.
To conclude, we briefly discuss how to derive deterministically the chain code c. We propose
to generate a different chain code ci for each node vi of the wallet by running our DHKA a
second time: An attacker that compromises a node in the hierarchy can only uncover the public
identifiers of the nodes in its subtree, but would not gain any knowledge about the others in
the hierarchy.
This last scenario depicts how to use Arcula in the real-world setting that BIP32 proposes,
i.e. where the addresses of the wallet look uncorrelated from one another (i.e., a user can
have multiple pseudonyms) and public derivation is enabled (and requires the chain code c). As
before, Arcula outperforms BIP32: It achieves its properties of private and public key derivation,
it improves the privacy of the users by allowing them to use pseudonyms, but it does not suffer
from its key recovery vulnerability (Section 2.1, Equation (1)).
7 Handling Dynamic Changes to a Deterministic Key Assign-
ment Access Hierarchy
This section details how to handle dynamic changes to the access hierarchy (e.g., insertion of
a node or deletion of an edge) of our deterministic key assignment scheme of Section 4 and, in
turn, within Arcula, our hierarchical deterministic wallet of Section 5.
Handling dynamic changes to the access hierarchy of the DHKA requires us to consider two
problems. First, how to correctly enforce the hierarchy after the modification (e.g., preventing
a node from accessing a subtree after an edge to that subtree is removed); second, how to deal
with modifications to the structure of G that change the path from the root to any node vi
along which we deterministically derive the secret values Si (e.g., removing the parent of a
node). We solve these problems through the following strategies. First, we modify the graph
G by adding an explicit root node to it, vR, such that there exists an edge between vR and
any root node of G (i.e., any minimal node in a topological ordering of G). More in details, we
define G′ = (V ∪ {vR} , E ∪ {(vR, vi) | vi has no predecessors in G}). It is easy to prove that
both G and G′ define equivalent access hierarchies.
Next, we associate an additional identifier, that we call version, to each node by including
it in its label. Let Ver : V → N be a public mapping associating an integer wi ∈ N to any
node vi ∈ V . Every node vi initially starts from version wi = 0, and we modify Items 1 and 2
of Construction 1 to account for it when deriving the node label li:
li = vi‖wi
Every time we modify the graph G′ in such a way that it would require updating the secret of a
node vi, we do so by updating its version wi, deterministically computing its new label li, and,
in turn, its new secret Si.
In the remainder of this section, we leverage the version associated to each node to perform
a rekey procedure, defined as follows for every node vh and for every node vp such that vp is
the parent of vh in G
′.
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1. Increase the version wh of the node vh to a new value wh
′ and update the Ver data
structure. Then, compute a new label l′h = vh‖w
′
h and update the corresponding entry in
Pub. Finally, compute a new secret S′h = FSp(11‖l
′
h), a new pair of secret and intermediate
keys x′h = FS′h(01‖l
′
h) and t
′
h = FS′h(00‖l
′
h), and update the Sec mapping.
2. For each incoming edge (vk, vh) of vh, update the public information y
′
kh←$Encrkh(t
′
h‖x
′
h)
stored on the edge to reflect the updated values t′h and x
′
h.
Finally, we deal with the dynamic modifications of the graph:
Deletion of an edge: Let (vi, vj) ∈ E be the edge that is to be removed from G
′. Our goal
is twofold: First, to prevent vi from accessing the cryptographic keys of vj . Second, to
make sure that if the deletion of the edge changes the derivation path from the root vR of
the hierarchy to vj, then the deterministic generation of the secret Sj changes accordingly.
We begin by tackling this last problem. Let vp be the parent node of vj in G
′. If vi = vp
and if there is no other edge (vp′ , vj) ∈ E (i.e., there does not exist another predecessor of
vj that is a candidate to become its new parent), then the deletion of the edge (vi, vj) ∈ E
results in disconnecting of vj from the access hierarchy. In that case, we add a connecting
edge (vR, vj) to G
′ that creates a single-hop path from the root to vj and allows the
deterministic key derivation of its secret Sj. We note that the addition of this edge does
not modify the access hierarchy, i.e. it does not allow vj to derive the secrets of any node
that was not previously between its descendants Desc(vj).
Next, we prevent vi from accessing the cryptographic keys of vj by performing the rekey
procedure for each node vh ∈ Desc(vj) (this includes vj as well).
Deletion of a node: The deletion of any node vi corresponds to first removing all the incoming
and outgoing edges of vi through the procedure specified above. Then, to removing
the public and secret information associated with vi from the Pub, Sec, and Ver data
structures.
Insertion of an edge: Let (vi, vj) ∈ E be the edge to be included into G
′. We consider two
cases:
• After the addition of the edge vi is the parent of vj in G
′. As before, we perform
the rekey procedure for each node vh ∈ Desc(vj) to update their secret values and
to allow the deterministic derivation.
• Otherwise, compute rij = Fti(10‖lj), yij ←$Encrij (tj‖xj), and augment Pub to con-
tain the mapping (vi, vj) 7→ yij.
Insertion of a new node: Let vi be the node to insert, together with a set of new edges in
and out of it. Let vj be the parent of vi. We begin by computing a deterministic public
label li = vi‖wi (where wi = 0) and a deterministic secret value Si = FSj(11‖li); then,
we compute ki = FSi(01‖li) and we augment Pub with the mapping vi 7→ li, Sec with the
mapping vi 7→ (Si, xi), and Ver with the mapping vi 7→ 0. Finally, we proceed to insert
the edges one by one using the edge insertion procedure specified above.
Key Replacement: To replace the cryptographic key xi associated to any node vi, we perform
the rekey procedure for each node vh ∈ Desc(vi).
This approach allows our deterministic key assignment scheme to handle dynamic changes
to its access hierarchy and requires the manager of the key assignment (e.g., a crypto-currencies
exchange) to keep track of the version of the nodes stored within the Ver mapping in addition
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to the structure of the graph G. Because of the determinism of our scheme every change to
a node vj also propagates to all its descendants. As an example, the replacement of its secret
key xj requires incrementing its version wj in the label lj to compute a new secret value and a
new cryptographic key. In turn, this causes the secret information and the cryptographic keys
of all its descendants vi to change as well (because of the deterministic derivation of the secret
values Si = FSj(11‖li)). The cost of such an update depends on the particular application
and the structure of the access hierarchy. If we use the DHKA to handle the keys associated to
traditional Bitcoin transactions, for example, updating the cryptographic key of a node requires
sending its funds to a new address and involves the payment of a transaction fee. Most of the
times, however, we are particularly interested in appending new leaves to the access hierarchy
(e.g., to create a new node for an incoming payment). This operation is a particular case of the
insertion of a new node with a single incoming edge. It never modifies any derivation path and,
as a consequence, it does not perform the rekey procedure, it does not change any cryptographic
key, and it does not require transactions on the blockchain. Finally, when we use Arcula to
enable the public derivation of addresses, we identify the nodes of the wallet through the cold
storage public key wpk and a label. Both the addition of a new node and the update of the
label lj of an existing node vj result in a new Arcula address (i.e., a locking script that contains
a new label). Spending the funds destined to the new address requires a new certificate, signed
by the cold storage public key wpk, that associates the public key pkj to the new (or updated)
label lj.
8 Time-Bound Deterministic Hierarchical Key Assignment
A hierarchical key assignment scheme aims at assigning a cryptographic key to every user of an
access hierarchy so that users with higher privileges can autonomously derive the keys of the
others within their subtrees, i.e., with lower privileges in the hierarchy. Many uses cases require
constraining these assignments according to some time restrictions. For example, a service
provider aims to provide a user with her cryptographic keys only as long as she pays for her
subscription to the service. To achieve this goal, it can leverage a key assignment scheme that
takes time into account, and that enables the users to deriver their cryptographic keys during
a given period only (e.g., one month). This section details how we incorporate these temporal
capabilities into the deterministic hierarchical key assignment scheme of Section 4 and within
Arcula, our design hierarchical deterministic wallet (Section 5).
In the last few years, many researchers focused on how to incorporate temporal capabilities
into HKA schemes [5, 2, 9]. The solutions proposed first modify the hierarchy of the assignment
to consider, at the same time, both the access privileges and the temporal constraints. Then,
assign a set of secrets to the nodes of the augmented hierarchy so that the users can perform
the key derivation according to the time constraints.
We add these constraints to our DHKA by relying on the work of De Santis et al. [9] that
shows how to design a time-bound key-indistinguishable HKA scheme from any provably secure
HKA scheme (and, in particular, from our DHKA). Let G = (V,E) be an access hierarchy and
let T = {t1, t2, . . . , tn} be a sequence of distinct time periods. Each user vi belongs to a node of
the hierarchy for a non-empty contiguous subsequence Ti = {tj, . . . , tk } ⊆ T of time periods.
5
Let P = {Ti}vi∈V be the set of time subsequences Ti when every user vi ∈ V belongs to the
hierarchy. The authors start from the observation that the contiguous subsequences Ti ∈ P
implicitly define a partially ordered hierarchy, where Ti < Tj ⇐⇒ ∀tk ∈ Ti =⇒ tk ∈ Tj,
i.e. iff Ti is included in Tj. They call this relation the interval hierarchy, and they use its
5In [9] the subsequence of time periods of a node vi ∈ V is denoted by λi.
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minimal representation, where every node except the leaves has precisely two edges, to augment
the original access hierarchy encoded by the graph G. As a result, they build a new graph,
GT = (VT , ET ), that enforces both the access and the interval partially ordered hierarchies. GT
contains a copy of the interval hierarchy for each node in G. A user vi derives the cryptographic
key assigned to its descendant vj for the period tk ∈ Tj by following the path in the augmented
graph GT along the copy of the interval hierarchy related to vj and then through the original
access hierarchy encoded by G. The instantiation of the (D)HKA scheme on the graph GT
results in a (deterministic) time-bound hierarchical key assignment scheme.
By construction, the number of nodes and edges in GT grows quadratically in the size of T
and in the dimension of G. In turn, the amount of public information required by a generic HKA
scheme on GT grows comparably. As we have seen in Section 4.2, however, the determinism of
our DHKA scheme allows us to reduce the amount of public information required significantly:
The nodes of the access hierarchy can derive the secret information of their descendants by
leveraging their own secrets and only rely on the public information when a node has two or
more predecessors. In the same way, when we augment the access hierarchy encoded by G to
account for the interval hierarchy into GT , the determinism of the scheme allows us to reduce
the amount of public information required. The augmented hierarchy GT , indeed, stores a
copy of the minimal interval hierarchy for every node of G. Every node of the minimal interval
hierarchy only has a single predecessor and, as a result, does not require any public information
associated to its edges. For this reason, when we leverage our design of DHKA to incorporate
the temporal capabilities into an HKA scheme, the size of the public information required grows
only linearly with the dimension of the access hierarchy G and, in particular, is independent of
the cardinality of T .
To conclude, we show how to incorporate these temporal capabilities into Arcula, our design
of HDW based on DHKA and digital signatures. Our construction provides the users of the
access hierarchy with a certificate and a signing key. The certificate, signed by the cold storage
public key, authorizes the signing key to spend the coins addressed to their identities. When we
add the temporal capabilities to the DHKA we assign a different signing key to each user vi for
each time period tj ∈ Ti; then, we provide her with a certificate σi,j for each key. We prevent
the users from signing new transactions through an outdated key by adding an expiration date
to these certificates so that they are only valid until the end of the period tj . As a result, every
user vi will require an updated certificate, signed by cold the storage key, after each time period
passes. The stack-based scripting language of Bitcoin Cash does not allow yet to check for the
expiration date of a certificate. For this reason, our design of time-bound Arcula requires, at
the time of writing, a more powerful scripting language, e.g. an Ethereum smart contract.
9 Related Work
Hierarchical Deterministic Wallets in Bitcoin and other blockchain-based crypto-systems only
attracted the interest of a few researchers in the past years. Courtois et al. [7] are the first to
investigate on HDW and on the security issues that arise with the design of BIP32. They show
that the public derivation property comes at a considerable security cost: By compromising a
single private key at any level of the hierarchy, an attacker can recover the secrets of the whole
access structure and spend all the assets held within the wallet.
Gutoski and Stebila [14] move a first step in solving the security issues of BIP32 and propose
a new construct for HDW that tolerates key leakage. More in details, each node of their wallets
holds n master private keys and as many corresponding public keys. The secret and public keys
of each child are derived by computing a linear combination of the master private keys. As a
result, the authors design a wallet that allows public-key derivation and that can tolerate the
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leakage of at most n private keys. Nonetheless, this comes at an increased storage cost, since
each node must now explicitly store n public keys.
Goldfeder et al. [13] and subsequently Gennaro et al. [12] design a threshold-based ECDSA
signature scheme useful for securing Bitcoin wallets. In [13], they leverage the threshold ECDSA
signature to implement a two-factor wallet, allowing a user to share its secret key among two
devices. On the other hand, [12] propose a non-hierarchical deterministic wallet where the secret
key is shared among n parties and at least t of them are required to sign a transaction. Their
implementation allows the participants to derive new public keys while keeping the correspond-
ing secret key shared among the n parties. Dikshit and Singh [10] extend the threshold-based
ECDSA signatures to allow the participants of the protocol to have different weights (e.g., so
that the executives of a company have more weight than their employees).
Fan et al. develop an HDW that is secure against privilege escalation and that allows public-
key derivation [11]. Their work leverages Schnorr signatures and trapdoor hash functions to
enable the users to sign new transactions without accessing their private keys. On a high level,
their wallet works as follows: The root node of the hierarchy creates the Schnorr signature of a
generic message through the trapdoor hash function. Then, the users on the lower levels of the
hierarchy leverage their private trapdoor hash function key to find a hash collision and to reuse
the signature created by the root to validate a new message of their choice. That said, we note
that the wallet proposed by Fan et al. suffers from the following issue. A generic node of the
hierarchy is not allowed to sign on behalf of the users of its subtree (i.e., the private derivation
property does not hold) unless the root node explicitly authorizes it—and to do so, it needs
to reveal its master private trapdoor key. This means that any node authorized by the root is
able not only to sign new transactions on behalf of the users in its subtree but also of the users
higher in the hierarchy (i.e., to escalate its privileges).
10 Conclusions
In this work we presented Arcula, a new hierarchical deterministic wallet (HDW) that outper-
forms the state of the art BIP32, that is built on provably secure cryptographic primitives,
and that, in particular, is secure against privilege escalation. To do so, we developed a key
indistinguishable deterministic hierarchical key assignment (DHKA) scheme that we use to de-
terministically generate the set of cryptographic keys at the core of our wallet. As a result, an
attacker that compromises an arbitrary number of users in the hierarchy can not escalate his
privileges and compromise any user higher in the hierarchy. In addition, our wallet allows to
derive a new address for receiving payments in an entirely untrusted environment, to recover
every cryptographic key from an initial seed provided by the user, and also to spend coins
on behalf of users lower in the hierarchy. Our design of Arcula considers the current and the
future requirements of modern blockchains. In particular, Arcula is independent of the under-
lying signature scheme, and it works, out of the box, with any crypto-system that allows the
verification of signatures on an arbitrary message (e.g., Bitcoin Cash or Ethereum). For these
reasons, we hope that the outcomes of this work will be twofold: To provide the secure and
efficient hierarchical deterministic wallet that we need today and to set a new standard for
future wallets.
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A Security proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
We prove the theorem by contradiction, using a hybrid argument. Let v∗ be the challenge chosen
by an adversary A in the game Gsk−indΠ,A (λ,G). We define the following hybrid experiments:
G−1: is exactly the game G
sk−ind
Π,A (λ,G).
G0: is the same as G−1, except that the secret S0 of the root node v0 ∈ Anc(v
∗) is sampled at
random.
G
(a)
i : is the same as G
(c)
i−1 (for i = 1 is the same as G0), except that ti−1, xi−1 associated to
the node vi−1 ∈ Anc(v
∗) and Si of the node vi ∈ Anc(v
∗) are sampled at random.
G
(b)
i : is the same asG
(a)
i , except that rij associated to the edge (vi, vj) (where vi, vj ∈ Anc(v
∗))
is sampled at random.
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G
(c)
i : is the same as G
(b)
i , except that yij associated to the edge (vi, vj) (where vi, vj ∈ Anc(v
∗))
is an encryption of a random message, i.e., yij ←$Encrij (mˆ) where mˆ is sampled at random.
Our DHKA is identical to the HKA of Atallah et al. [3], except that the secret Si of a node
vi is computed by evaluating Si = FSj (11‖li) where Sj is the secret of the parent vj of vi (in [3]
each Si is sampled at random). Hence, the proof is analogous to [3, Theorem 5.3] except that
we need to prove that each Si is indistinguishable from random. For this reason, we modify the
game G
(a)
i (defined in [3, Theorem 5.3]) in such a way that the secret Si is sampled at random
too (in addition to ti−1, ki−1). Then, we prove the same result for the root node v0 by adding
an additional game G−1 and by showing G−1 ≈c G0.
Lemma A.1. Let {Fk}k∈Kλ be a secure pseudorandom function, then G−1 ≈c G0.
Proof. We assume that there exists a DAG G = (V,E) and a distinguisher D that has a non-
negligible advantage in distinguishing between G−1 and G0. Then, we build an adversary A
that distinguishes Gprf−0F,A (λ) and G
prf−1
F,A (λ) as follows:
1. D outputs the challenge v∗.
2. A simulates Set as follows: For the root node v0, set S0 = OF(11||l0). For any other
node vj, compute Sj as described in Construction 1. Then, for each node vi ∈ V and
for each edge (vi, vj) ∈ E, compute the secret values ti = FSi(00‖li), xi = FSi(01‖li),
rij = Fti(10‖lj), yij ←$Encrij (tj‖xj) as described in Construction 1. A sets x
0
v∗ = xv∗ and
x1v∗ = x¯v∗ where x¯v∗ is sampled at random. Finally, A sends Pub and x
d
v∗ to D where d is
a random bit.
3. A answers any OΠCorr(vi) query by returning Si.
4. D outputs a bit d′ and A completes the simulation of the experiments G−1 and G0 by
returning 1 if d = d′; otherwise it returns 0.
5. Lastly, D outputs its guess. A outputs any bit b that D outputs.
When A is playing respectively Gprf−0F,A (λ) and G
prf−1
F,A (λ), then the reduction perfectly simu-
latesG−1 andG0. Indeed, if A is playing withG
prf−0
F,A (λ) (resp. G
prf−1
F,A (λ)) then, S0 = OF(11‖l0)
(resp. S0 is randomly sampled from {0, 1}
∗). In addition, A computes all the secrets and edge
information following Construction 1. As such, the advantage of the attacker A in distinguishing
G
prf−0
F,A (λ) and G
prf−1
F,A (λ) is non negligible. This concludes the proof.
The rest of the proof is analogous to the one of Atallah et al., except that in G
(a)
i we
additionally sample Si at random. We refer to [3, Theorem 5.3] for the proofs that G0 ≈c G
(a)
1
and G
(a)
i ≈c G
(b)
i , G
(b)
i ≈c G
(c)
i , G
(c)
i−1 ≈c G
(a)
i for any i ∈ {2, . . . , |Anc(v
∗)| − 1}.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 5.1
We prove the theorem by contradiction, using a hybrid argument. Let (vj,m, σ) be the forgery
returned by A in the game GheufΠ,A (λ,G). We define the following hybrid experiments:
G0: is exactly the game G
heuf
Π,A (λ,G).
Gt: is the same as Gt−1, except that the challenger generates at random the signature key pairs
(sk′i, pk
′
i) for the first t nodes in Anc(vj). More in details, let Anc(vj) = {v0, . . . , vt, . . . , vj },
for every vi ∈ {v0, . . . , vt} the challenger generates the signature key pair (sk
′
i, pk
′
i) by
running KGenΣ(1
λ).
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The proof idea is to first show, using a hybrid argument, that G0 ≈c G|Anc(vj)|. Hence, a
potential adversary A has the same advantage in both G0 and G|Anc(vj)|, with overwhelming
probability. Then, we show that an adversary A for G|Anc(vj)| implies an adversary A
′ for
GeufΣ,A′(λ).
Lemma A.2. If Γ is key indistinguishable, then Gt−1 ≈c Gt for every 1 ≤ t ≤ |Anc(vj)|.
Proof. We assume that there exists a DAG G = (V,E) and a distinguisher D that has a non-
negligible advantage in distinguishing between Gt−1 and Gt. Then, we build an adversary A
against the experiment Gsk−indΓ,A (λ,G) (defined in Definition 4.2) as follows:
1. A samples at random v∗. Let Anc(v∗) = {v0, . . . , vt, . . . , v
∗} be the set of ancestors of v∗
according to an ordering of the nodes of the graph (e.g., a topological sorting). A sends
vt to the challenger and receives Pub and xt .
2. A samples the pair (wsk,wpk)←$KGenΣ(1
λ).
3. A executes the remaining steps of SetΠ (Item 2 of Construction 2), except that it skips
Item 2a and it replaces Item 2b with the following:
• If vi ∈ {v0, . . . , vt−1}, then compute (sk
′
i, pk
′
i)←$KGenΣ(1
λ).
• Otherwise, if vi = vt, then compute (sk
′
t, pk
′
t) = KGenΣ(1
λ;xt).
• Otherwise, send a OΓCorr(vi) query to the challenger and receive Si = mski. Compute
xi = DeriveΓ(G,Pub, vi, vi, Si) and (sk
′
i, pk
′
i) = KGenΣ(1
λ;xi).
Finally, A outputs the master public key mpk = (G,Pub,{σˆi}vi∈V ,wpk).
4. A answers oracle queries in the following way:
• On input vi for O
Π
Corr, A invokes O
Γ
Corr(vi) and returns the output.
• On input (m, vi) for O
Π
Sign, A returns σ = (pk
′
i, σ
′, σˆi) where σ
′←$ SignΣ(sk
′
i,m).
5. A receives the forgery (vj,m, σ). It aborts the simulation if v
∗ 6= vj ; otherwise it completes
the simulation by returning the result of VrfyΠ(pkj,m, σ), where lj = Pub(vj) and pkj =
(wpk, lj).
6. A outputs the decisional bit received from D.
Let Eabort be the event that A aborts the simulation. It is easy to see that Pr[¬Eabort ] =
Pr[v∗ = vj ] =
1
|V | . Let G
sk−ind−b
Γ,A (λ,G) be the key indistinguishability game with bit b. Condi-
tioned on the event ¬Eabort, when A is playing respectively G
sk−ind−0
Γ,A (λ,G) andG
sk−ind−1
Γ,A (λ,G),
then the reduction perfectly simulates Gt−1 and Gt, because D can not corrupt any node
v ∈ Anc(v∗). Hence, the advantage of the attacker A in winning the game Gsk−indΓ,A (λ,G) is
non-negligible. This concludes the proof.
Lemma A.3. If Σ is existentially unforgeable, then for every DAG G = (V,E) and PPT
adversary A, Pr
[
G|Anc(vj)|,A(λ,G) = 1
]
≤ negl(λ).
Proof. We assume that there exists a DAG G = (V,E) and an adversary A that has a non-
negligible advantage againstG|Anc(vj)|,A(1
λ, G). Then, we build an adversary A′ againstGeufΣ,A′(λ)
as follows:
1. A′ receives pk∗ from the challenger.
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2. A′ flips a bit d←$ {0, 1} and samples at random v∗←$V , S−1 = (S
0
−1, S
1
−1)←$S.
3. A′ simulates SetΠ. It runs (Pub,Sec) = SetΓ(1
λ, G, S0−1). If d = 0, it sets wpk = pk
∗;
otherwise it runs (wsk,wpk) = KGenΣ(1
λ;S1−1). Lastly, A
′ executes the remaining steps of
SetΠ (Item 2 of Construction 2), except it replaces Item 2b and Item 2c with the following:
Item 2b: A′ proceeds as follow:
• If vi ∈ Anc(v
∗) \{v∗}, then compute (sk′i, pk
′
i)←$KGenΣ(1
λ).
• If vi = v
∗, set pk′i = pk
∗ if d = 1; otherwise run (sk′i, pk
′
i)←$KGenΣ(1
λ).
• Otherwise (if vi 6∈ Anc(v
∗)), run (sk′i, pk
′
i) = KGenΣ(1
λ;xi) where (Si, xi) =
Sec(vi).
Item 2c: If d = 1, then retrieve the label li = Pub(vi) and compute σˆi←$ SignΣ(wsk, (pk
′
i, li));
otherwise, set σˆi←$O
Σ
Sign((pk
′
i, li)).
Finally, A′ sends to A the master public key mpk = (G,Pub,{σˆi}vi∈V ,wpk).
4. A′ answers oracle queries in the following way:
• On input vi for O
Π
Corr, A
′ returns mski = Si where (Si, xi) = Sec(vi).
• On input (m, vi) for O
Π
Sign, if d = 1 ∧ vi = v
∗, A′ sets σ′←$OΣSign(m); otherwise, it
computes σ′←$ SignΣ(sk
′
i,m). Lastly, it returns σ = (pk
′
i, σ
′, σˆi).
5. A′ receives the forgery (vj , m˜, σ˜) such that σ˜ = (pk
•
j , σ
•, σˆ•j ) and aborts the simulation if
v∗ 6= vj ∨ (d = 0 ∧ pk
•
j = pk
′
j) ∨ (d = 1 ∧ pk
•
j 6= pk
′
j). Otherwise, if d = 0, it sends the
forgery ((pk•j , lj), σˆ
•
j ) to challenger where lj = Pub(vj); if d = 1 sends (m,σ
•).
Let Eabort be the event that A
′ wins the game GeufΣ,A′(λ) and aborts the simulation. First of all,
note that:
¬Eabort = ¬
[
v∗ 6= vj ∨ (d = 0 ∧ pk
•
j = pk
′
j) ∨ (d = 1 ∧ pk
•
j 6= pk
′
j)
]
=
[
v∗ = vj ∧ ¬(d = 0 ∧ pk
•
j = pk
′
j) ∧ ¬(d = 1 ∧ pk
•
j 6= pk
′
j)
]
=
[
v∗ = vj ∧ (d = 1 ∨ pk
•
j 6= pk
′
j) ∧ (d = 0 ∨ pk
•
j = pk
′
j)
]
=
[
v∗ = vj ∧ ((d = 0 ∧ d = 1) ∨ (d = 1 ∧ pk
•
j = pk
′
j)
∨(d = 0 ∧ pk•j 6= pk
′
j) ∨ (pk
•
j 6= pk
′
j ∧ pk
•
j = pk
′
j))
]
=
[
v∗ = vj ∧ ((d = 1 ∧ pk
•
j = pk
′
j) ∨ (d = 0 ∧ pk
•
j 6= pk
′
j))
]
Let Pr
[
pk•j = pk
′
j
]
= p. We can express Pr[¬Eabort ] in the following way:
Pr[¬Eabort ] = Pr
[
v∗ = vj ∧ (d = 0 ∧ pk
•
j 6= pk
′
j) ∨ (d = 1 ∧ pk
•
j = pk
′
j)
]
= Pr[v∗ = vj ] ·
(
Pr
[
d = 0 ∧ pk•j 6= pk
′
j
]
+Pr
[
d = 1 ∧ pk•j = pk
′
j
])
= Pr[v∗ = vj ] ·
(
Pr[d = 0] · Pr
[
pk•j 6= pk
′
j
]
+ Pr[d = 1] · Pr
[
pk•j = pk
′
j
])
=
1
| V |
·
(
1− p
2
+
p
2
)
=
1
2· | V |
Let QΣSign and Q
Π
Sign be respectively the set of queries submitted by A
′ to OΣSign and the set
of queries submitted by A to OΠSign. Conditioned on ¬Eabort and since A is a valid adver-
sary for GheufΠ,A (λ,G), then, with non-negligible probability, VrfyΠ(pkj , m˜, σ˜) = 1 if and only if
VrfyΣ(wpk, (pk
•
j , lj), σˆ
•
j) = 1 and VrfyΣ(pk
•
j , m˜, σ
•) = 1, where pkj = (wpk, lj) and lj = Pub(vj).
Note that A′ outputs a valid forgery for GeufΣ,A′(λ) with probability
1
2 :
31
1. Whenever d = 0, we have wpk = pk∗ and pk•j 6= pk
′
j . This allows us to conclude that A
′
never asked (pk•j , lj) to oracle O
Σ
Sign (I.e., (pk
•
j , lj) 6∈ Q
Σ
Sign). Hence, ((pk
•
j , lj), σˆ
•
j) is a valid
forgery for GeufΣ,A′(λ).
2. On the other hand, if d = 1, we have pk•j = pk
′
j = pk
∗. Since, A is a valid adversary it
must produces a valid signature for a new fresh message. Hence, we can conclude that
(v∗, m˜) 6∈ QΠSign and (m˜, σ
•) is a valid forgery for GeufΣ,A′(λ).
This concludes the proof.
By combining Lemma A.2 and Lemma A.3 we have that Construction 2 is hierarchically
existentially unforgeable.
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